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I. INTRODUCTION

A defendant sits in the witness stand undergoing examination
by his attorney. He is accused of armed robbery, among other criminal
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acts. During the course of the defendant's testimony, a juror blurts out
that he has a question. The judge tells the juror to write his question
down and advises the juror that he will be able to ask his question
upon completion of the attorneys' examinations. When the juror's
question is finally asked, the judge indicates to the defendant's attorney
that the attorney should address the matter raised by the juror on
reexamination. During the reexamination, the attorney turns to the
jury box and directly addresses the individualjuror,inquiring whether
the juror's question had been sufficiently answered. At this point,
several other jurors, feeling released from their silence, also begin
questioning the witness. The judge or attorneys occasionally rephrase
the questions, but often the witness answers the jurors directly. Neither
party objects to the jurors'questionsat the time of trial.
The members of the jury in the trial discussed above appear to
have acted as inquisitors. Instead of listening passively to the
presentation of evidence from the opposing parties, they pose their
own questions to the defendant. In an inquisitorial system of justice,
used in many civil law countries, judges or juries have the primary
responsibility for gathering and evaluating evidence.1 These fact
finders actively seek evidence, such that the parties become mere
objects of inquiry rather than the directors of the trial. 2 In contrast to
the inquisitorial system, the United States' adversarial system assigns
the primary responsibility for the development and presentation of
evidence to the parties themselves. 3 In the adversarial system, an
impartial fact finder decides a case based on the conflicting evidence
presented by opposing parties. 4 The depiction above, however,
describes not a trial governed by the inquisitorial system of justice,
5
but rather a recent trial in the Eastern District of New York.
Commentators and courts are currently questioning the
efficacy of our jury system. 6 Some view the system as too rigid and
1.
(1998).
2.

Monroe H. Freedman, Our ConstitutionalizedAdversary System, 1 CHAP. L. REV. 57, 74
Sean Doran et al., Rethinking Adversariness in Nonjury Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J.

CRIM. L. 1, 18 (1995).

3.
Freedman, supra note 1, at 57.
4.
Id.
5.
United States v. Bush, 47 F.3d 511, 512-14 (2d Cir. 1995) (reviewing the record of the
district court). After the defendant was convicted, he brought an appeal claiming that allowing
jurors to question witnesses, including defendants, during a criminal trial was reversible error.
Id. at 512.
6.
E.g., Steven D. Penrod & Larry Heuer, Tweaking Commonsense: Assessing Aids to Jury
Decision Making, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 259, 260 (1997) (stating that there is a "high
intensity and frequency of recent jury criticism"); Eugene R. Sullivan & Akhil R. Amar, Jury
Reform in America-A Return to the Old Country, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1141, 1141 (1996) ("The
present [jury] system is being judged inadequate by the bench, the bar, the press, and the
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unreliable a truth-finding body. 7 These critics suggest altering aspects
of the jury system, and most recommend alterations that encourage a
more active and involved jury.8 One such proposed alteration 9 would
permit the jury to pose questions to witnesses during trial. 10 Many
jurisdictions are either considering or are currently experimenting
with the use of juror questioning.1 1
Presently, the propriety of juror questioning is a widely
contested matter.1 2 The debate also focuses on the necessary
safeguards that should be required if the practice is ultimately
deemed proper.1 3 There are few guidelines available to assist trial
courts in implementing the practice.' 4 Because the factors leading
courts to find prejudice in a case are not clearly defined, trial courts
15
are often left to their own discretion.
To understand the issue of juror questioning, it is best to begin
with a historical overview of the jury system and the adversarial
process. The consequences of giving the jury a more active role can
only be analyzed effectively with this history in mind. Part II of this
Note will discuss the history of the jury system and provide an
overview of the merits of the current adversarial system. Part III will
examine the practice of juror questioning and its impact on the
adversarial system. Part III also examines the history of jury
questioning and analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of the
practice. It looks at the practice's current status in jurisdictions across
public."). The recent criticisms of juries led the Judicial Council of California to create a special
commission to evaluate the jury system and recommend changes. J. Clark Kelso, Final Report of
the Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1433, 1436 (1996).
7.
See e.g., Douglas G. Smith, Structural and FunctionalAspects of the Jury: Comparative
Analysis and Proposalsfor Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 443-45 (1997).
8.
Penrod & Heuer, supra note 6, at 260. Proposed alterations include allowing jurors to
take notes during trial and deliberations and allowing jurors to question witnesses. Id. at 261.
9.
The term "alteration" indicates that this issue has only recently become a topic of widespread discussion. The actual practice of juror questioning has been used infrequently
throughout the history of United States jurisprudence.
10. E.g., Peter B. Krupp, When Jurors Speak: A Practical Guide to Jurors Questioning
Witnesses in Massachusetts, BOSTON B.J., Sept./Oct. 2001, at 12.
11. See, e.g., R.N. Singh et al., Reforming the Jury System: What do the Judges Think?, 63
TEX. B.J. 948, 950-51 (2000) (noting that the Texas Supreme Court appointed a Jury Task Force
to research and evaluate possible jury reforms, including allowing jurors to question witnesses).
12. Janessa E. Shtabsky, Comment, A More Active Jury: Has Arizona Set the Standard for
Reform with its New Jury Rules?, 28 ARiZ. ST. L.J. 1009, 1011 (1996).
13. Mark C. Roberts, II, Comment, Evidence - Witnesses - Jurors May Not Pose Written
Questions to Witnesses in Criminal Cases, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1421, 1423-25 (1993) (stating that
courts and commentators are debating both the merits of juror questioning and the procedures to
be utilized if the practice is allowed).
14. Penrod, supra note 6, at 262.
15. Kara Lundy, Note, Juror Questioning of Witnesses: Questioning the United States
CriminalJustice System, 85 MINN. L. REV. 2007, 2007 (2001).
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the country and sets forth current views about the appropriateness of
the practice in general. Part IV suggests procedural safeguards
designed both to eliminate or reduce potential problems with juror
questioning and to preserve the virtues of the adversarial system.

II. THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM OF JUSTICE
The American criminal justice system strives to balance the
government's dual interests in enforcing its laws and protecting its
citizens" rights to receive fair trials. 16 The Constitution and the
American adversarial system provide a criminal defendant the right to
17
a trial before an impartial jury.
A. Development of the AdversarialSystem
Dispute resolution procedures have evolved over time.1 8 The
adversarial system currently employed in the United States is a
product of the evolution of both English and American jurisprudence. 19
Precursors to the current adversarial system of justice include the
medieval period's trials by battle, wager of law, and ordeal. 20 Each of
these methods was premised upon divine intervention-a belief that
God would intervene and demonstrate the correct judgment. 21 Trial by
battle involved disputants, or sometimes their representatives,
engaging in "physical combat until one side yielded... was decisively
defeated, or, in certain serious criminal matters, was slain."22 In the
Middle Ages, people believed that the results of the battle were the
judgments of God. 23 The often unfavorable and drastic results of trial
by battle rendered this form of dispute resolution unpopular and
24
eventually obsolete.
16. Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND.
L.J. 301, 303 (1999).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury."); Stephan Landsman, A Brief Survey of the
Development of the Adversary System, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 713 (1983).
18. Id. at 717.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 717-19.
21. Id. at 719.
22. Id. at 717.
23. W.J.V. WINDEYER, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 44 (2d ed. 1957) ('Men who honored
warlike gods were ready enough to settle their disputes by personal combat, on the assumption
that the gods would give to the combatant, whose quarrel was just, strength to vanquish the
wrongdoer.").
24. Landsman, supra note 17, at 718. The decisions often favored the rich, who either had
fighting skills or could hire those who did to stand in for them as their "champions." Id.; see also
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Trial by wager of law produced equally biased results but was
more popular because it used less drastic means. 25 In a trial by wager
of law, one of the litigants was required to make an oath that he was
speaking the truth.26 This litigant won his case if he had enough
advocates, or compurgators, taking an oath in his support.2 7 The
compurgators were not required to have any firsthand knowledge of
the case. The litigant with the most compurgators to support his
claims would prevail in the trial.28 Hence, the wager of law has been
described as a "character test."29 Its bias stemmed from the fact that
those who were popular in a given community would have more
30
supporters and would therefore prevail.
In a trial by ordeal, the litigant would agree to undergo some
physical test. Tests used included carrying a red-hot iron bar, placing
31
an arm in boiling water, or being bound and lowered into water.
Medieval Europeans believed that if the litigant were telling the
truth, God would intervene and show a sign by protecting the person
32
from harm in the course of the ordeal.
By the middle of the thirteenth century, these three medieval
methods were either banned or seriously criticized. 33 Although these
medieval methods may seem arcane, they contributed to the evolution
of the adversarial process.3 4 As Stephan Landsman, a prominent legal
historian, notes, "[The medieval methods] helped to establish the
principle that the parties to a dispute should play the preeminent part
in the procedure leading to its resolution." 35 The outcome of a dispute
"depended entirely upon the physical strength, stamina, intelligence,
36
or self-control of the party."

FRANKLIN STRIER, RECONSTRUCTING JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR TRIAL REFORM 12 (1994) ("[T]rial

by battle never became popular in England, partly because it was hard to see God's hand in it,
and partly because it was foisted on the populace by the hated Normans.").
25. Landsman, supra note 17, at 718.
26. Id.
27.

J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 5 (3d ed. 1990). The bias

stems from the fact that those who were popular in a given community would have more
supporters and would therefore prevail.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Landsman, supra note 17, at 718.
31. WINDEYER, supra note 23, at 14.
32. Id. Such signs included the lack of festering burns after carrying a hot iron rod or
putting an arm in boiling water or the ability to float when bound and placed in cold water. Id.
33. Landsman, supra note 17, at 720 (noting that these methods of dispute resolution did
not often use legitimate evidence or fact-finding and were not "even remotely adversarial").
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Sward, supra note 16, at 321.
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As the medieval methods of dispute resolution declined in
popularity in Europe, trial by jury gained prominence. 37 By the
thirteenth century, trial by jury was the predominant judicial
procedure. 38 While not proven, it is commonly believed that the jury
derived from the "inquisition" introduced to England by William the
Conqueror.3 9 Skeptics of the prior medieval methods preferred the "socalled rational mode of trial ...[whereby] litigants looked to peers for
40
redress, rather than divine retribution or reward."
The presentment jury, or grand jury, was the first type of jury
to appear in the criminal justice system. 41 These juries issued reports
of the criminal acts committed by local citizens and prepared
indictments for their prosecution. 42 A second jury was used to decide
the guilt or innocence of the indicted party. 43 In the early history of
the jury, several of the same individuals who served on the initial
grand juries would be on the second jury. 44 The early juries "were not
the neutral and passive fact finders that they eventually became when
incorporated within the adversary framework." 41 Often, no evidence
was heard, and the juries relied on divine guidance to reach a
resolution. 46 Furthermore, the juries were composed of persons with
knowledge of the dispute in question, and members were allowed to
conduct an investigation in the community before trial began. 4 7 Thus,
48
the early juries "were more like witnesses than passive fact finders."
In this sense, these juries were more inquisitorial than adversarial. 49
Juries retained their inquisitional nature for many years in both

37. Id. The jury system was incorporated into the English judicial process by the end of the
twelfth century. Landsman, supra note 16, at 720.
38. Sward, supra note 16, at 322.
39. Jeffrey Reynolds Sylvester, Comment, Your Honor, May I Ask a Question? The Inherent
Dangersof Allowing Jurors to Question Witnesses, 7 COOLEY L. REV. 213, 214 (1990).
40.

STRIER, supra note 24, at 12.

41. Landsman, supra note 17, at 720, 724 (providing a history of the civil jury system and
the role of the church in dispute resolution).
42. Id. at 720.
43. Id. at 721.
44. Id. Thus, persons who reported and indicted other citizens were also those who decided
their guilt or innocence. Id. at 720-21.
45. Id. at 721.
46. Id. at 721-22. But see Sylvester, supra note 39, at 214-15 (noting that there was some
control over these early juries). It was possible for a second jury to convict the first jury of
perjury and impose significant penalties on those individuals, including imprisonment or the
destruction of their homes. Id.
47. Landsman, supra note 17, at 722.
48. Sward, supra note 16, at 322.
49. Landsman, supra note 17, at 722. The juries were an "active and inquiring body
searching for material truth." Id.
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England and the United States. 50 Even now, the "grand jury functions
as an inquisitorial body seeking evidence upon which to premise
'51
criminal indictments.
Slowly, however, the jury system evolved into an increasingly
adversarial process. 52 By the fourteenth century, prospective jurors
could be removed from the jury panel for potential bias, and contact
between jurors and litigants was curtailed. 53 From at least the
"fifteenth century onward[,] jurors began to rely upon what was
presented in court as the basis for their decision." 54 After lawyers
gained prominence, formal witness testimony became the accepted
form of evidence, and formal rules of evidence subsequently were
developed. 55 By the end of the eighteenth century, the adversarial
system had become "firmly established not only in England but also in
America." 56
B. The Modern AdversarialSystem
The United States has utilized an adversarial system of justice
since the time of the American Revolution.5 7 It was incorporated into
the Constitution by the Framers and has been elaborated upon by the
Supreme Court. 58 Landsman asserts that the
central precept of [the] adversary process is that out of the sharp clash of proofs
presented by adversaries in a highly structured forensic setting is most likely to come
the information from which a neutral and passive decision maker can resolve a litigated
dispute in a manner that is acceptable both to the parties and to society. 59

Therefore, the adversarial system requires a neutral and passive fact60
finder-either judge or jury.
In the adversarial system, lawyers on opposing sides argue
their cases before this neutral and passive trier of fact. 61 Opposing

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53, Id.
54, Id. at 723; STRIER, supra note 24, at 13 ("[It was not until the fifteenth century that the
jury had transformed from a body of witnesses to a body which hears witnesses.").
55. Id. at 725-27.
56. Id. at 730.
57. Id. at 713.
58. Freedman, supra note 1, at 52; see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
59. Landsman, supra note 17, at 714.
60. Id. at 713.
61. Nancy Amoury Combs, Comment, Understanding Kaye Scholer: The Autonomous
Citizen, the Managed Subject and the Role of the Lawyer, 82 CAL. L. REV. 663, 683 (1994).
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attorneys "control the presentation of evidence and argument" 62 and
attempt "to persuade the fact finder, whether judge or jury, that its
presentation of the facts is more convincing than that of the opposing
side." 63 The system therefore encourages the opposing sides to find
and present their most persuasive evidence. 64 However, evidentiary,
procedural, and ethical rules prevent a "win-at-any-cost" attitude on
the part of the opposing attorneys. 65 The fact finder is prohibited from
making any judgments before the conclusion of the evidence and from
66
becoming actively involved in gathering evidence.
Despite its long-established tradition, recent reforms in the
jury system may move the United States away from the adversarial
system of justice. 67
C. Merits of the AdversarialSystem
The conceptual underpinnings of the adversarial system should
be preserved. Professor Wayne R. LaFave notes that the system's
superiority in producing accurate verdicts rests on two premises: (1)
"that adversaries will uncover more facts and transmit more useful
information to the decision maker" and (2) that the adversarial system
avoids "decisionmaker bias," a prosecutorial slant that results from
decisionmakers also acting as fact finders. 68 The parties' self-interest
ensures the production of relevant evidence and the expression of the
strengths and weaknesses of the opposing side's case. 69 For example,
because a defendant in a criminal case has a powerful incentive to
stay out of jail, he or she will accordingly research and present all of
the favorable evidence and legal defenses. Alternately, the State has
an interest in protecting its citizens and will present all potential
evidence of guilt to obtain a conviction. The system also rejects a

62. Id.
63. Hyongsoon Kim, Note, Adversarialism Defended: Daubert and the Judge's Role in
Evaluating Expert Evidence, 34 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 223, 226 (2001).
64. Landsman, supra note 17, at 715.
65. Id. at 716.
66. Id. at 715 ("[11f the decision maker strays from the passive role he risks prematurely
committing himself to one version of the facts and failing to appreciate the value of all the
evidence... [N]eutrality and passivity are essential not only to ensure an evenhanded
consideration of each case, but also to convince society that the judicial system is trustworthy;
when a decision maker becomes an active questioner ... society is likely to perceive him as
partisan rather than neutral.").
67. See id. at 738, n.179.
68. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.4(c) (2d ed. 1999).
69. Id.
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hierarchical model of seeking justice in favor of a "coordinate model." 70
The coordinate model used by the adversarial system divides
authority for developing and presenting evidence, determining legal
issues, and deciding a verdict. 71 The result of this division of authority
72
is a system of checks on the power of the decisionmakers.
Douglas G. Smith suggests other merits of the adversarial
system-specifically the merits of the traditional role of the jury-in
Structural and FunctionalAspects of the Jury.73 These merits include
manifesting the "sovereignty of the people," barring governmental
abuse, and preventing abuse by lawyers. 74 He quote Alexis de
Tocqueville's observation that the American jury functions as "a
political institution ... one of the forms of sovereignty of the people." 75
Smith notes that the jury imports community values, and hence a
democratic quality, to the process of adjudication because,
conceptually, a defendant is being judged by his peers. 76 A group of
twelve citizens may better represent the "average" member of society
than a single judge. 77 In addition, Smith states that the "jury
[especially the criminal jury] may counteract both judicial bias as well
as corruption."7 8 Smith notes that juries provide "an inestimable
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against
the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge." 79 A final merit of the
traditional jury is the addition of legitimacy to the adjudicatory
process.80 A single judge may be less able than a group of twelve
citizens to represent the "average" member of society."' The jury is less
likely than a single individual to be perceived as biased, and jury
decisions based upon community values are therefore more likely to be
82
considered legitimate.

70. Id.; Smith, supra note 7, at 472. ("[T]he jury was thought to hold the 'class instincts of
the judge in check,' being composed of members of the community as opposed to being drawn
from an elite class within society.").
71. This model contrasts with the inquisitorial system, which places nearly all authority in
the fact finders rather than in the parties. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Smith, supra note 7, at 469-89.
75. Id. at 470-71 citing 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 291 (Henry
Reeve trans., Knoph 1945).
76. Id. at 473.
77. Id. at 484.
78. Id. at 475.
79. Id. at 477 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
80. Id. at 482.
81. Id. at 484.
82. Id. at 482.
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The adversarial system has many merits that are worth
preserving. Any reforms to the jury, a central aspect of this system,
should be examined closely to ensure that these merits are protected.
III. JUROR QUESTIONING

A. History of JurorQuestioning
1. Criticisms of the Traditional Passive Jury
Juries have increasingly become a focus of discussion as a
result of media influence.8 3 For example, in 1891 Mark Twain
observed, "[t]he jury system puts a ban on intelligence and honesty,
and a premium upon ignorance, stupidity and perjury. It's a shame
that we must continue to use a worthless system because it was good a
thousand years ago."8 4 More recently, an editorial comment on the
public response to jury verdicts following several highly publicized
cases stated:
The Rodney King verdict sparked riots in Los Angeles and demands for mixed juries in
all cases. The hung jury in the Menendez brothers' first murder trial led to calls for less
than unanimous verdicts. And the "not guilty" verdict in the O.J. Simpson case has led
some critics to call for scrapping the jury system altogether.8 5

Similarly, some commentators have argued that the truly
passive jury is an unattainable goal.8 6 They assert that the rules of
evidence "developed in large measure to control the jury and to
channel its decision making. 8 7 Empirical research on juries indicates
that jurors "bring expectations and preconceptions with them to the
jury box, actively searching for causal explanations to make sense of
the events described, and consciously or unconsciously process
information ...in ways that may strongly influence their decisions. 88
The traditional passive jury may appear inconsistent with the reality
of jurors as "active information-processors." Several commentators

83. Penrod & Heuer, supra note 6, at 259 (stating that it is "clear that the jury is currently
a highly visible feature of the American justice system" and noting that one possible reason for
the increased focus on juries is the advent and prevalence of modern media).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 260 (quoting Judging Juries, USA TODAY, June 16, 1997, at 18A).
86. Id.
87. Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics,
87 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1857 (2001).
88. Id. at 1859-60.
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assert that the jury system should be adapted to fit this more active
model.8 9
Such criticisms have influenced public attitudes regarding the
jury system. 90 In fact, some members of the American public have
become so disillusioned with the current jury system that they refuse
to participate in the process. In California, the Blue Ribbon
Commission on Jury System Improvement announced that the state
jury system was "in crisis" and "on the brink of collapse."9 1 The
commission found that the public expressed their dissatisfaction with
the current jury system by refusing to appear for jury duty when
92
called for service.
The debate over the role of the jury has led many courts,
commentators, and legislatures to propose and implement practices to
improve the efficient functioning of the jury.93 One proposal would
94
permit jurors to question witnesses during trial.
2. Implementation of the Practice
Juror questioning is not a recent development in the United
States. 95 In 1895, a state appellate court addressed the issue for the
first time and explicitly approved of the practice. 96 In 1907, North
Carolina became one of the first states to formally permit jurors to
question witnesses, with certain limitations on the types of questions
that could be asked. 97 The first federal appellate court to address the

89. Id. at 1860.
90. Id. (quoting MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 343 (Hartford, CT, Am. Publ'g Co. 1891)).
91. Kelso, supra note 6, at 1445.
92. Id. The Commission noted that, because of an inability to provide a sufficient number of
jurors, this refusal occasionally resulted in delayed trials. Id.
93. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 39(b)(10) (allowing jurors to take notes during trial and to
submit written questions to the judge); see also Kelso, supra note 6, at 1508 (stating that the
California Commission investigating juror improvements recommended giving trial courts
discretion to permit jurors to question witnesses). In fact, the Commission found that "the
benefits of juror questioning" outweigh the "largely speculative concerns that have been raised
about the practice." Id. at 1507-08.
94. Kelso, supra note 6, at 1507-08.
95. Laurie Forbes Neff, Comment, The Propriety of Jury Questioning: A Remedy for
Perceived Harmless Error,28 PEPP. L. REV. 437, 437 (2001).
96. Schaefer v. St. Louis & Suburban Ry. Co., 30 S.W. 331, 333 (Mo. 1895) (holding that it
was not prejudicial to allow jurors to question witnesses). The court stated, "We do not see why it
was not a commendable thing in both the court and the jury endeavoring to ascertain just exactly
the situation at the time [of the facts in question], so that they could properly determine the case
before them." Id.
97. Neff, supra note 95, at 437. The court limited the allowable questions to those whose
purpose was to elicit the truth. Id.
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issue of juror questioning deemed its utilization to be within the
98
discretion of the trial court.
Despite the early recognition of juror questioning, the Federal
Rules of Evidence remain silent on the issue. Ellyn C. Acker states
that the Rules "neither permit nor prohibit juror questioning of
witnesses during trial."99 The issue is currently being debated in many
jurisdictions across the United States. Despite the possible
constitutional implications of such an interference with the right to a
fair trial and due process, the Supreme Court has yet to address the
issue of juror questioning.
B. The Effectiveness of JurorQuestioning
1. Advantages of Juror Questioning
Courts and commentators have recognized advantages and
disadvantages to allowing jurors to question witnesses in open court.
The perceived advantages of juror questioning include the following:
having a more active, focused, and involved jury that perceives a
greater sense of responsibility and participation in the pursuit of
justice; helping jurors resolve questions they may have regarding the
facts or the law;10 0 increasing the public's perception of the credibility
of the jury;10 1 serving as a check on the power of judges and
attorneys; 10 2 and helping attorneys structure their cases to address
10 3
and resolve issues troubling the jury.
Social science research supports the proposition that jurors
learn more by engagement "rather than passively trying to absorb

98. Id. (stating that United States v. Witt, 215 F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir. 1954), was the first
federal appellate case to address the issue).
99. Ellyn C. Acker, Standardized Proceduresfor JurorInterrogation of Witnesses, 1990 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 557, 557 (1990). But see Sylvester, supra note 39, at 216 (noting that while the
issue of juror questioning is not explicitly mentioned in the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Rules
"provide that the court may interrogate witnesses and control the mode of questioning to most
effectively ascertain the truth").
100. Krupp, supra note 10, at 12 ("There can be little dispute that a juror, who does not
understand certain terms used in a line of questions or who cannot picture the scene, will not
follow or recall the line of questioning as well as a juror who does. Thus, advocates of juror
questions have pointed to the salutary benefits of jurors being able to seek clarification by
questioning the witness before the witness is off the stand.").
101. Kelso, supra note 6, at 1506.
102. Id.
103. Shtabsky, supra note 12, at 1020-21.
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information." 104 Proponents of juror questioning note that allowing
jurors to question witnesses engages them more in the process,
making them more satisfied with their service. 10 5 Also, allowing jurors
to communicate their perceptions of the trial to the attorneys provides
the attorneys with valuable insights about the fact finders which may
10 6
alter their advocacy strategies.
Furthermore, proponents of juror questioning point out that
this practice is part of the normal procedure in England.10 7 In
England, the jurors' questions are submitted in writing to the judge.108
After conferring with the attorneys, the judge has discretion to ask the
questions for the jurors.10 9 Since no major problems have resulted
from this practice in England, proponents suggest that the practice
would also work well if adopted in the United States. 110

2. Disadvantages of Juror Questioning
In contrast, several courts and commentators have noted the
disadvantages associated with juror questioning. Perhaps the
practice's greatest potential drawback is the danger of jurors losing
their neutrality by becoming advocates for a specific party through
their questioning.1 This loss of neutrality would impair the proper
function of the adversarial system of justice. As one commentator
noted, "[T]he line between impartial fact finder and partisan
interrogator or advocate may be a difficult one to define." 112 A juror's
question may unintentionally be prejudicial to a party, affecting the
adversarial process. 113 The resulting bias created in the other jurors
could "interfere with the constitutional requirements of due process
114
and a fair trial."
104. Krupp, supra note 10, at 12 (discussing the more active role jurors are allowed to play in
the Massachusetts courts and noting that juror questioning is "perhaps the most controversial"
aspect of that more active role).
105. Id.
106. Acker, supra note 99, at 561.
107. Sullivan & Amar, supra note 6, at 1142.
108. Id. at 1143.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. United States v. Bush, 47 F.3d 511, 515 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that the "most troubling
concern is that the practice risks turning jurors into advocates, compromising their neutrality").
The court further noted, "It is difficult for jurors to be both active participants in the adversarial
process, embroiled in the questioning of witnesses, and detached observers, passing on the
credibility of the witnesses and the plausibility of the facts presented." Id.
112. Krupp, supra note 10, at 12.
113. See id.
114. Kelso, supra note 6, at 1506.
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There are other risks inherent in the practice. There is the risk
that giving jurors the opportunity to form and ask questions may lead
them to engage in premature deliberation. 115 Jurors also might weigh
the answers to questions asked by themselves or by fellow jurors more
heavily
than
evidence
presented
through the
attorneys'
examinations. 116 Other potential drawbacks include longer trials, the
possibility that jurors will not focus on the evidence presented because
they are preoccupied with forming their own questions,11 7 and the
"nuisance to the judge and courtroom staff."118 Since jurors are often
untrained in the law and unfamiliar with the rules of evidence, there
is a grave risk that their questions may be irrelevant, improper, or
confusing. 119 Additionally, an attorney's litigation strategy may be
undermined by a particular question or series of questions.1 20

115. Bush, 47 F.3d at 515 (warning that "[a]t the very least, jury questioning is a subliminal
invitation to launch prematurely into evaluating the evidence"); United States v. Brockman, 183
F.3d 891, 898 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that "the process of formulating questions may precipitate
prematurely the deliberation phase of [the] trial") (quoting United States v. Groene, 998 F.2d
604, 606 (8th Cir. 1993)); DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 515-17 (4th
Cir. 1985) (stating that the practice of allowing jurors to question witnesses may lead them to
begin the reasoning process prematurely). One commentator, however, suggests that this
concern may not be a sufficient objection to the practice because, by empirical proof, jurors
commonly reach predeliberation judgments regardless of whether they are permitted to pose
questions to witnesses. B. Michael Dann, From the Bench: Free the Jury, 1 LITIG., Fall 1996, at 56.
116. Brockman, 183 F.3d at 899 (citing Groene, 998 F.2d at 606)1 see also DeBenedetto, 754
F.2d at 516-17 (finding that the "possibility that the jury will attach more significance to the
answers to [other jurors'] questions is great"). The DeBenedetto court recognized that "every trial
judge has noted the development in most lengthy trials of a cohesiveness in the jury as the trial
goes on, coming eventually almost to a spirit of camaraderie, in which the actions and reactions
of any individual juror are perceived by the jurors as those of the whole jury." Id. at 517.
117. Brockman, 183 F.3d at 899 (listing increased duration of a trial and lack of attention as
potential disadvantages of allowing jurors to question witnesses). Also, the possibility that a
juror, untrained in the law, may want to be "Perry Mason" is disquieting. This person may take
advantage of the ability to ask questions to pose many questions and thus try to steer the focus
of the trial. As the DeBenedetto court noted, human nature lends itself to the possibility that one
or two jurors may dominate the jury inquries. DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 516; see also, Springfield
v. Thompson Sales Co., No. 23595, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 1285, at *13-14 (Mo. Ct. App. July 24,
2001)(recognizing that jurors may become distracted while forming questions). Juror distraction
and preoccupation may be increased in trials that attract media attention, because jurors may
seek individual attention by frequently interrupting the trial to ask questions or even inject
information about the case obtained from an extraneous source. Krupp, supra note 10, at 32.
118. Kelso, supra note 6, at 1507.
119. E.g., DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 516 (raising the possibility that "under the worst case, a
juror question may emerge which is so prejudicial as to leave only a declaration of mistrial as an
appropriate remedial step, with all the waste that flows from a mistrial"). While holding that the
juror's questioning was permissible, the court advised that the risk of a improper or prejudicial
question is usually "greater than a trial court should take" absent compelling circumstances. Id.
120. Thompson Sales Co., 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 1285, at *13.
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A final drawback to juror questioning is the challenge that
lawyers would face in deciding how to manage an improper question.
By objecting to a juror's question, a lawyer risks alienating that
juror. 121 By deciding not to object, however, a lawyer may waive the
ability to raise the issue on appeal. 122 Remedial measures to overcome
an improper question, such as a judge's instruction to disregard the
question, may not be sufficient, because jurors may already have
taken the question into account.123
Several commentators argue that these possible drawbacks
outweigh the potential advantages of juror questioning and that the
practice should therefore be prohibited. 124 Advocates of juror
questioning, however, argue that the potential disadvantages can be
countered by implementing certain safeguards, such as requiring
125
jurors to submit their questions to the judge in writing.
C. Current Status of JurorQuestioning
1. The Propriety of the Practice
Almost every jurisdiction that has addressed the issue of juror
questioning has determined that the practice is not prejudicial per
se. 126 New Jersey, however, has declined to allow juror questioning
until the New Jersey Supreme Court addresses the issue. 127 Only
Mississippi 28 and Nebraska 129 prohibit the practice. 130 This Note will

121. United States v. Bush, 47 F.3d 511, 515 (2d Cir. 1995).
122. Id.
123. Remedial measures undertaken by a court after an objection may leave a juror feeling
embarrassed or angry. Furthermore, even with remedial measures, "the poison introduced by an
improper inquiry from a fellow juror has already been absorbed by the entire jury." Id. at 51516. A similar notion is found in the DeBenedetto court's analysis. The court noted that "it is
questionable how effective remedial steps are after the jury has heard the question."
DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 516. These remedial measures may lead the juror to feel uncomfortable,
and the other jurors may "retain whatever mindset [was] created by the question." Id.
124. Shtabsky, supra note 12, at 1011 (noting the "resistance to reforming the current jury
system").
125. E.g., Dann, supra note 115, at 5, 64-66.
126. E.g., United States v. Richardson, 233 F.3d 1285, 1288 (l1th Cir. 2000) ("[W]e reject
outright [appellant's] argument that permitting juror questioning of witnesses is per se error.
Indeed, every circuit to consider the practice has permitted it, holding that the decision to allow
juror questioning rests within the discretion of the trial judge."). The legislatures of Arizona and
Florida have also enacted statutes specifically mandating the practice. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 39(b)(10);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.50(3) (West Supp. 2002).
127. Richardson, 233 F.3d at 1288 (discussing State v. Jumpp, 619 A.2d 602, 609-13 (N.J.
Super Ct. App. Div. 1993)).
128. Wharton v. State, 734 So. 2d 985, 990 (Miss. 1998).
129. State v. Zima, 468 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Neb. 1991).
130. Krupp, supra note 10, at 13.

1536

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1521

next detail the current practices that have been adopted by various
jurisdictions.
a. Advocates of Limiting or ProhibitingJurorQuestioning
In Wharton v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court of Mississippi
held that "juror interrogation is no longer to be left to the discretion of
the trial court, but rather is a practice that is condemned and outright
forbidden by this Court." 13 1 This decision overruled two prior cases,
which had granted trial courts discretion to permit juror questions. 13 2
The prior cases cautioned against the potential dangers of the
practice, but in Wharton the court noted that these warnings had not
been heeded in several subsequent decisions. 133 The court stated that
the "most obvious problem" with the practice was "the unfamiliarity of
the jurors with the rules of evidence" and noted that "[o]ur system is
an adversary one which depends upon counsel to put before lay fact
finders that which should be admitted in accordance with the rules of
evidence." 134 The dissenting judge in Wharton disagreed and
maintained that the dangers inherent in juror questioning could be
avoided, for the most part, by granting trial judges discretion and
providing them with procedural guidance. 135
Nebraska also prohibits juror questioning. Nebraska v. Zima
was the first case in that state to address the issue of juror
questioning.1 36 The court examined other jurisdictions and noted that
there appear to be two groups: One group discourages juror
questioning but leaves the issue to the discretion of the trial court; the
other group outlines procedures for implementing the practice.1 37
Although the procedural guidelines outlined by the second group
resolved some of the dangers associated with the practice, the court

131. 734 So. 2d at 990. Although the court concluded that the practice was reversible error,
the court deemed the juror questioning in this case to be harmless. Id. The court held, however,
that juror questions could only be allowed in the limited situations of clarifying issues presented
by the attorneys. Id. at 988.
132. Id. at 990.
133. Id.
134. Id. (quoting State v. Hays, 883 P.2d 1093, 1099-1100 (Kan. 1994)). The court noted
other dangers inherent in the practice, including the risk of offending a juror by objecting to a
question, the loss of juror impartiality, the potential for premature deliberations, and the
disruption of courtroom decorum. Id. (citing Hays, 883 P.2d at 1099).
135. Id. at 993 (Mills, J., dissenting) (concluding that allowing juror questioning is useful to
clarify issues for the jury).
136. State v. Zima, 468 N.W.2d 377, 379 (Neb. 1991).
137. Id.
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concluded that at least one fundamental problem remains. 138 The
court found that impartiality was threatened by permitting jurors to
pose questions and that this problem could not be resolved 1by
39
implementing the procedures utilized in other jurisdictions.
Furthermore, the court noted, "Since due process requires a fair trial
before a fair and impartial jury, the judicial process is better served by
the time-honored practice of counsel eliciting evidence which is heard,
evaluated, and acted upon by jurors who have no investment in
obtaining answers to questions they have posed."1 40 The court also
warned that changing the adversary system would not create a "fairer
or more reliable truth-seeking procedure." 141 Therefore, the court
14 2
prohibited juror questioning of witnesses in Nebraska trial courts.
In Texas, the practice is barred in criminal cases. 143 The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals has ruled that the use of juror questioning
is reversible error.1 44 In Morrison v. Texas, the court noted that the
Texas Rules of Evidence do not explicitly mention the practice of juror
questioning. 145 The court then looked to Criminal Rule 610(a), which
gives trial courts discretion to control the order of interrogation of
witnesses and presentation of evidence. 14 6 However, the Criminal
Rules do not provide explicit guidance as to whether jurors are
allowed to question witnesses. 47 Thus, a divided court held that the
"adversary theory as it has prevailed for the past [two hundred] years
maintains that the devotion of the participants, judge, juror and
advocate, each to a single function, leads to the fairest and most
efficient resolution of the dispute."'148 The court concluded that
allowing jurors to deviate from their traditional role as passive fact-

138. Id. ("Although the techniques employed by the second group of jurisdictions (1)
minimize the likelihood of debacles such as that in this case, (2) may obviate the concern which
would otherwise face counsel who fear that raising an objection would alienate the questioning
juror, and, (3) to a lesser extent, address as well the question of juror qualification to examine
witnesses, they do not deal with the more fundamental question" concerning the effect of juror
questioning on juror impartiality.).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 379-80 (citations omitted).
141. Id. at 380. The court stated that the practice may cause jurors to "become advocates and
possible antagonists of the witnesses." Id.
142. Id.
143. Texas rejects juror questioning only in criminal cases; the issue is still open with regard
to civil cases. STEVEN GOODE ET AL., TEXAS PRACTICE: GUIDE TO THE TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE

CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 611.1 (2d ed. 1993)
144. Morrison v. State, 845 S.W.2d 882, 883, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
145. Id. at 885.
146. TEX. CRIM. R. EVID. 610(a).

147. See id.
148. Morrison, 845 S.W.2d at 885.
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finders could undermine this essential aspect of the adversary
system. 149 The court also cautioned that active participation could
result in jurors assuming an active adversarial, or even inquisitorial,
stance. 150 The court felt that this problem would arise even if
procedural safeguards were applied. 15 1 Furthermore, the court noted
that the practice may result in other disadvantages, such as
encouraging the jury to deliberate before the parties have concluded
their cases and before the court has instructed them on the proper
application of the law. 152 Because of this potential threat to the
adversarial system, the court held that criminal trial courts could not
experiment with this practice of juror questioning without legislative
153
authority.
Three years after the Morrison decision, the Texas Supreme
Court appointed a one-hundred-member task force to study and
recommend changes to the Texas jury system. 154 The task force
examined the issue of juror questioning and recommended that the
practice be prohibited in all cases.1 55 The task force later surveyed
judges on issues involving the jury. 156 The survey data revealed that a
slight majority of judges disagreed with the task force's conclusion and
indicated that they would prefer to have discretion to permit jurors to
question witnesses. 157 Not all of the judges agreed, however. One judge
contended that "[t]he fact is that the rules have been developed over
literally thousands of years and are, for the most part, what they are
158
for a reason."
The majority of courts technically allow the practice of juror
questioning but discourage its use in practice. In Massachusetts, for
example, the "Supreme Judicial Court has cautiously endorsed the
practice, explicitly recognizing the perils of permitting jurors to pose
questions of their own." 159 In Commonwealth v. Urena, the Supreme
149. Id. at 885-87.
150. Id. at 887.
151. Potential procedural safeguards are discussed in detail infra, Part IV.
152. Morrison, 845 S.W.2d at 888.
153. Id.
154. Singh, supra note 11, at 950.
155. Id. at 951.
156. Id. The task force mailed questionnaires to 202 Texas district judges, and 115 responses
were received and studied. Id. at 952. It is important to note that the judges surveyed were civil
court district judges.
157. Id. The results showed that fifty-nine judges wanted discretion while fifty-six either did
not or were undecided on the issue. Id. at 951.
158. Id. at 952. Another judge held the opposite view, stating that "jurors are becoming
increasingly disenchanted with the jury process" and that changes therefore might be necessary.
Id. at 952-53.
159. Krupp, supra note 10, at 12.
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Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated that "the practice of allowing
jurors to question witnesses has the potential for introducing
prejudice, delay, and error into the trial, and should be utilized
infrequently and with great caution." 16 The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts granted trial courts discretion over whether to
161
employ the practice in any given case, but this discretion is limited.
The court outlined detailed procedures that trial courts must follow if
162
they decide to permit juror questioning.
b. Advocates of Juror Questioning
While the majority of courts discourage juror questioning
because of its potentially harmful consequences, 16 3 some courts view
the practice favorably. 164 For example, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
has indicated its approval in several cases. In Slaughter v. Kentucky,
the court stated that juror questioning is "proper" as long as the
questions are both pertinent and competent. 65 In Louisville Bridge &
Terminal Co. v. Brown, the Supreme Court of Kentucky further stated
that jurors may be aided in discovering and understanding the facts
and evidence presented in trials if they are permitted to ask questions
of witnesses. 166 Most significantly, the court stated in Stamp v.
Commonwealth that the practice should be encouraged in the interest
of justice and fair play, because, as the court found, it is often
necessary for the jury to ask questions to obtain a fair understanding
67
of the issues.
Some commentators have also advocated juror questioning. As
one commentator notes, "[The] practice [of juror questioning] seems to
160. 632 N.E.2d 1200, 1206 (Mass. 1994).
161. Krupp, supra note 10, at 30.
162. Id.
163. E.g., United States v. Bush, 47 F.3d 511 (2d Cir. 1995).
164. E.g., Slaughter v. Kentucky, 744 S.W.2d 407, 413 (Ky. 1987). The courts in several
earlier cases also viewed the practice approvingly. See, e.g., Louisville Bridge & Terminal Co. v.
Brown, 277 S.W. 320, 322 (Ky. 1925); Stamp v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W. 242, 246 (Ky. 1923).
While this Note focuses on the practice of juror questioning in criminal cases, it may be useful to
note that at least one court of appeals for civil cases in Texas has approved of the practice.
United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1085 (5th Cir. 1979) ("If a juror is unclear as to a point
in the proof, it makes good common sense to allow a question to be asked about it."); Morrison,
845 S.W.2d at 888.
165. Slaughter, 744 S.W.2d at 413.
166. Louisville Bridge & Terminal Co., 277 S.W. at 320 (explaining that the practice of jurors
asking questions of witnesses will likely aid them in discovering and understanding the actual
facts and evidence).
167. Stamp, 253 S.W. at 242 (finding that the practice should be encouraged in the interest
of justice and fair play, because it is often necessary for the jury to ask questions to gain a fair
understanding of the issues).
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be an eminently salutary one that, if judiciously used, would enable
jurors to clear up the trivial confusions that sometimes impede the
search for truth."168 One justification for the practice is that it
16 9
enhances the jurors' understanding of the facts and issues in a case.
B. Michael Dann, Chair of the Arizona Supreme Court Committee on
More Effective Use of Juries, believes that "the traditional passive
jury that absorbs evidence and law should be changed to an active jury
that participates as a near equal with the judge and counsel."'170 He
advocates allowing the jury to ask questions because he believes that
letting jurors voice their confusion will help to ensure a fair verdict.171
For Dann, the image of the "ideal juror" as a passive recipient of
information is based on "assumptions or wishful thinking about
human behavior and our adversarial system, not on empirical
validation."1 72 In fact, he suggests that empirical studies disprove this
supposedly ideal model. 173 Dann asserts that a more active jury is less
likely to encounter confusion and that feedback from jurors will assist
the judge and attorneys in identifying difficult areas during the course
of the trial. 174 He does, however, advocate the adoption of appropriate
175
safeguards.
District Court Judge Scott 0. Wright advocates juror
questioning and provides anecdotal evidence of an incident that
occurred in his courtroom to support his position.1 76 Judge Wright
permitted the jury to pose questions to witnesses and the court during
prosecution for a narcotics offense. 177 The defendant was accused of
selling narcotics to a third party. 78 The defendant's pants and a
videotape of the crime were both included as evidence. 179 During the
trial, a juror asked to review the videotape for a second time.1 80
168. GOODE, supra note 148, § 611.1 n.28 (noting that an ABA-Brookings Institution report
recommends the use of juror questioning).
169. See Slaughter, 744 S.W.2d at 413.
170. Dann, supra note 115, at 5.
171. Id.

172. Id. at 5-6.
173. Id. at 6. He suggests that the studies indicate that passive juries result in "juror
confusion, impairment of opportunities for learning, distraction, and boredom." Id.
174. Id. He also states that a more active jury will be more satisfied with their service than a
passive jury. Id.
175. Id. at 64. The safeguards he mentions include insisting upon written questions
presented to the judge and allowing attorneys the opportunity to object to the questions outside
the presence of the jury. Id.
176. Penrod & Heuer, supra note 6, at 260-61.
177. Id. at 260.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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During deliberations, the jury asked to review the tape a third time.18 1
The judge stated that one of the jurors "had noticed a tear in the
dealer's pants in the videotape and discovered a matching tear in the
defendant's pants. Within minutes the jury returned a verdict of
guilty." 18 2 The jury had noticed something that the attorneys, police,
and FBI agents had missed.18 3 They had discovered this crucial piece
of evidence by playing an active role in the trial process. 8 4 Judge
Wright's anecdote supports the ,view that jurors should play a more
active role in the judicial process. As one scholar notes, however, such
anecdotal examples have been "more the exception than the rule. In
the majority of trials, juror questions do not alter the outcome so
8 5
dramatically."
Whether they view the practice favorably or unfavorably, most
courts generally hold that the decision of whether to allow juror
questioning is best left to the discretion of the trial judge. Many courts
believe that the trial judge is in the best position to balance the
dangers of juror questioning against its benefits in specific cases. 8 6
2. Questioning Procedures and Their Impact on a Finding of Prejudice
There are not yet any uniformly agreed-upon guidelines for
implementing the practice of juror questioning. Arizona and Florida
are the only states that have enacted formal rules concerning the
practice. In 1995, the Arizona legislature adopted an amendment to
the state's trial court procedure statute authorizing the practice of
juror questioning and providing guidelines for its implementation. 8 7
The statute provides as follows:
Jurors shall be permitted to submit to the court written questions directed to witnesses
or to the court. Opportunity shall be given to counsel to object to such questions out of
the presence of the jury. Notwithstanding the foregoing, for good cause the court may
prohibit or limit the submission of questions to witnesses. 88

181. Id. at 260-61.
182. Id. at 261.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Acker, supra note 99, at 561.
186. E.g., United States v. Thomas, No. 99-3430, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 29372, at *10 (6th
Cir. Nov. 9, 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 935 (2001) (stating that "the practice of allowing
questions by jurors should be discouraged, but nevertheless is permissible and best left to the
discretion of the trial judge, who should balance the dangers against the benefits in any given
case").
187. AIZ. R. CIV. P. 39(b)(10).
188. Id.
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A comment to the amendment notes that jurors should be
instructed as to the procedures for submitting questions18 9 and should
be given instructions regarding unasked questions. 190 The comment
further provides that if a question is ruled admissible, the trial court
has discretion as to whether the court or counsel will pose the
questions to the witness. 191
Florida's statute has similar procedural features.1 92 Like the
Arizona statute, it provides that jurors must submit written questions
to the court. The court and attorneys then must review the questions
outside of the presence of the jury. The court may specify the means to
answer the jurors' questions. 193 The jury must be informed that they
"should not attach any significance to the failure of having their
question asked," because trial rules often prohibit certain types of
questions.1 94 Unlike Arizona's statute, the Florida statute grants the
195
trial court the option of limiting the submission of questions.
While still allowing the trial court significant discretion, the
Arizona and Florida statutes are more structured and comprehensive
than the limited guidance provided by many federal appellate courts.
The Eighth Circuit in United States v. George, while not explicitly
providing guidelines for use in future cases, upheld the jurorquestioning procedures used by the trial court.1 96 The procedures
employed by the lower court were very similar to those prescribed by
the Arizona statute. 197 In the trial court, juror questions were
submitted in writing and were discussed by the attorneys outside of
the presence of the jury.1 98 The judge then ruled upon each question,
rejecting "any question found by the court to be objectionable under

189. ARIz. R. Civ. P. 39(b)(10) cmt. (1995) (directing witnesses to submit their questions,
written and unsigned, to the bailiff during recess or, if the witness is about to leave the witness
stand, to signal to the bailiff and then submit the question).
190. The comment provides that if a juror's question is rejected because it calls for
inadmissible evidence, the court should instruct the jury that "trial rules do not permit some
questions to be asked and that the jurors should not attach any significance to the failure of
having their question asked." Id. It is unclear whether this instruction is to be given after every
rejected question or only once, before any questions are asked.
191. The trial court also would prescribe the means of answering the individual questions.
The means include, but are not limited to, stipulation or additional testimony. Id.
192. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.50(3)-(4) (\West Supp. 2002).
193. Id.
194. § 40.50(4).
195. § 40.50(3) ("The court may, as appropriate, limit the submission of questions to
witnesses.")
196. 986 F.2d 1176, 1179 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that "prejudice must be determined
according to the facts of each case").
197. See ARIz. R. CIV. P. 39(b)(10) cmt.
198. George, 986 F.2d at 1178.

2002]

MAINTAINING THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM

1543

the rules of evidence." 199 The jury had previously been instructed
about the questioning procedure and was told that it should not "draw
any factual conclusions from what it observed because it was the
20 0
judge's job to determine which questions were proper."
In contrast to the Eighth Circuit, in DeBenedetto v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., the Fourth Circuit determined that both the
propriety of the practice and the procedures used should be left to the
discretion of the trial judge. 20 1 The trial judge determined that there
20 2
should be no limit to the number of questions the jury could ask.
The judge also allowed the jurors to direct their questions orally to the
bench upon completion of both attorneys' examinations, and "if the
trial judge deemed the question proper, he instructed the witness to
answer it."20 3 After the question was asked and answered, the
attorneys were given the opportunity to reexamine the witness. 20 4 The
court noted that the only formal guidance for the practice was found in
Rule 611(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which instructs courts to
"exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating
20 5
witnesses."
In City of Springfield v. Thompson Sales Co., a division of the
Missouri Court of Appeals held that juror-questioning procedures
must remain uniform throughout the trial. 20 6 While recognizing that
the Missouri Supreme Court Rules established that the practice is not
prejudicial per se, the court found that the particular procedures
employed by the trial court that case were prejudicial. 20 7 The court
specifically held that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
invite, receive, and allow a large number of questions. 20 8 The trial
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Like the George court, the Fourth Circuit did not prescribe a "bright-line rule" for trial
courts to follow. See DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 516, 518 (4th
Cir. 1985).
202. The jury asked a total of ninety-five questions over the course of the three-week trial;
the foreman asked over half of the questions. See id. at 517.
203. Id. at 515 n.1.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 515 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 611(a)).
206. No. 23595, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 1285, at *21 (Mo. Ct. App. July 24, 2001) (holding that
the "absence of a clear, well-defined jury questioning procedure and the failure to include the
lawyers in the development of that process was an abuse of trial court discretion").
207. Id. at *16.
208. The trial judge told the jury that he would allow them to question witnesses and
explained that he was a "fan of juror questioning." Id. at *2. The Missouri Court of Appeals
found that this "actively and affirmatively" encouraged juror questions, although dicta in
previous cases had warned against the practice. Although the trial judge emphasized that the
jury was not "encouraged to ask large numbers of questions because that is the primary
responsibility of counsel," the jury was permitted to ask the witnesses a total of 127 questions
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judge had allowed the jurors to submit written questions to the bailiff,
which the judge and attorneys then reviewed to determine their
admissibility. 20 9 As a remedial measure, the court instructed the jury
that no adverse inference should be drawn if a question was not asked
or if the question was asked by the attorney, rather than the judge or
jury 210 The main reason the reviewing court found prejudice, however,
was that a uniform procedure was not employed throughout the
trial. 2 11 Not all of the witnesses were available for jury questioning
because their testimony was provided via videotape. 212 Another
problem was that the attorneys received no guidance as to the manner
in which the questioning should take place. 213 The procedure therefore
"evolved and changed by 'trial and error.' "214 Over the course of the
trial, the attorneys progressed from repeating the juror's question
verbatim to rephrasing and adding follow-up questions. 21 5 Both
attorneys in this case entered multiple objections to the use of juror
21 6
questioning; all of their objections were overruled.
Perhaps the most detailed procedures outlined by an appellate
court come from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 21 7 The
court, in Commonwealth v. Britto, encouraged trial judges to consult
with counsel concerning whether to allow juror questioning. 2 18 The

(excluding those questions found inadmissible pursuant to the rules of evidence). Id. at *5-6. One
juror asked thirty-two questions of a single witness. Id. at *5-7.
209. The conferences to determine admissibility of the questions were held outside the
presence of the jury. Id. at *5-6.
210. Id at *5.
211. Id. at *6-7.
212. Id. at *3. This "disparate treatment of witnesses" resulted in potential prejudice.
because at least one of the witnesses was "shielded from such interrogation." Id. at *23.
213. See id. at *16 (stating that "[a]dequate warning and inclusion of the lawyers in
developing a jury questioning procedure would have promoted a more consistent juror
questioning process and an opportunity for equal understanding of it by all litigants").
214. Id.
215. Id. at *16-18.
216. See id. at *2-4.
217. See Commonwealth v. Urena, 632 N.E.2d 1200, 1206 (Mass. 1994); Commonwealth v.
Britto, 744 N.E.2d 1089, 1105-06 (Mass. 2001). The guidelines offered by the court apply to both
criminal and civil cases in Massachusetts. Krupp, supra note 10, at 30.
218. Krupp, supra note 10, at 31. The court gave the following guidance to trial courts:
1. Although a trial judge may permit juror questioning over objections of the parties,
the Court "continue[s] ...to encourage judges" to consult with counsel about whether
to permit jurors to pose questions.
2. The judge should instruct the jurors that they will be allowed to pose questions,
but that they must remain neutral, should not direct their questions to help or
respond to any party, and must not assume the role of investigator or advocate ....
3. [Tlhe jurors' questions need not be limited to "important matters," but may also
"seek clarification of a witness's testimony."
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Supreme Judicial Court also provided that upon a trial judge's
determination that juror questioning will be allowed, the judge should
instruct that they may submit, in writing, neutral questions to the
judge to be asked of witnesses, but the court cautioned that jurors are
not to assume the role of advocate or investigator. 2 19 Additionally, the
judge should inform the jury that questions submitted may not be
posed to witnesses or may be altered in order to abide by the rules of
evidence. 220 The court dictated that the trial judge consult with
counsel regarding possible objections outside of the presence of the
jury after a juror submits a question. 221 Finally, the court
recommended that counsel be allowed a limited opportunity to crossexamine witnesses after a juror asks a question. 222 Despite the fact
that these instructions were given in definite terms, the court
indicated that a failure to follow any of the recommended procedures
223
would not result in reversal absent a showing of prejudice.
There are also conflicting views on the necessity and timing of
attorney objections to juror questioning. Courts are generally in
agreement "that an objection directed to the mere occurrence of juror
questioning must be raised at the time of trial in order to be asserted
on appeal."224 However, courts are divided as to whether objections are
required to particular questions in order to preserve the issue for

4. The judge should instruct the jurors that, although they are not expected to know
the rules of evidence, their questions will have to comply with those rules and
therefore the judge may have to alter or refuse particular questions.
5. The judge should instruct the jurors that, if the judge alters or does not pose a
particular question, the jurors should not be offended or hold that against either
party.
6. The judge should instruct the jury that they should not give the answers to their
own questions a disproportionate weight, and that they should not discuss the
questions among themselves.
7. The judge should repeat these instructions during the final charge.
8. All questions should be submitted in writing to the judge, with the juror's
identification number on each question.
9. After questions are submitted, counsel should have an opportunity, out of the
hearing of the jury, to examine and object to the questions, and for the judge to rule on
those objections ....

10. After the juror questions are posed, counsel should be given the opportunity to
reexamine the witness, usually limited to the subject matter raised by the juror
questions and the witness's answers.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Britto, 744 N.E.2d at 1106.
224. Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Propriety of Jurors Asking Questions in Open Court
During Course of Trial, 31 A.L.R.3d 872 (1970).
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appeal. 225 From the examples discussed above, it is clear that trial
courts are left with a great deal of discretion to determine both when
juror questioning will be allowed and what procedures to follow if it is
allowed. This discretion leads to inconsistency, both among courts in
different jurisdictions and, in some cases, among courts within the
same jurisdiction.
IV. SUGGESTED GUIDELINES TO MINIMIZE THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF
JUROR QUESTIONING ON THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM

Guidelines for juror questioning should be established in order
to minimize the disadvantages inherent in the practice. These
guidelines can be developed either legislatively or judicially. As
discussed previously, any reforms to the traditional jury system
should be considered in light of preserving the virtues of the
adversarial process. These virtues include the increased legitimacy of
decisions, the prevention of abuse or attorney misconduct, the
encouragement of superior investigation and evidence presentation,
and the expression of popular sovereignty and democracy. Providing
protective guidelines for juror questioning helps preserve these
226
goals.
In contrast, some critics conclude that this practice violates the
constitutional right to a fair trial and due process. 227 They argue that
228
the adversarial system is premised upon a fair and impartial jury.
Allowing jurors to ask questions and possibly advocate for a particular
party would directly violate this premise. Juror questioning should
therefore either be prohibited entirely or permitted only with
procedural guidelines constructed to minimize the impact of the
practice on the jury. These guidelines could be imposed by legislatures
or by the judiciary.
For example, allowing clarifying questions does not conflict
with the ideals of the adversarial system. Questions indicating that
jurors did not hear a statement or could not understand its meaning
seem necessary to the successful operation of the adversarial process.
While a passive jury is desirable, the adversarial system assumes that

225. Id.
226. See supra Part II.C.
227. State v. Zima, 468 N.W.2d 377, 379-80 (Neb. 1991) (stating that allowing jurors to
actively participate in trials by questioning witnesses may upset "[d]ue process [which] requires
a fair trial before a fair and impartial jury").
228. Sylvester, supra note 39, at 213 (stating that neutrality is required for the adversarial
system).
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jurors will base their decisions on the evidence presented. 229 A juror
who does not hear or understand certain aspects of the evidence
presented by the parties will not be able to properly fulfill his or her
obligation. 23 0 Therefore, limited clarifying questions should be allowed
and encouraged.
Moreover, jurors should be able to request clarifications during
the course of the testimony. 231 While immediate questioning may
interrupt the pace of the party's evidence presentation and cause
slight delays, witnesses and attorneys would more easily be able to
address problems as they present themselves. If this process were not
permitted, not only would jurors be required to remember their
questions, but witnesses and attorneys would also be required to
recollect the context of the questioned statement. 23 2 Allowing jurors to
ask questions during the course of testimony would facilitate the
ability of the court reporter to locate and read back portions of
statements that were not heard by a juror. Permitting immediate
questioning would also enable the jury to hear the evidence in the
order desired and presented by the parties.
More stringent safeguards should be required for juror
questions that go beyond a mere request for clarification. Substantive
questions could lead to biased juries or waste of time. 23 3 Guidelines
should therefore be developed to assist courts in implementing this
practice. Moreover, jurors should be instructed on proper
procedures. 234 These instructions should include a statement that the
jurors should not give any additional weight to questions asked and
235
should not draw an adverse conclusion if a question is not asked.
The jury should also be informed that questions are often not asked
236
because evidentiary rules preclude them.
Additionally, jurors should be required to submit any questions
in writing to the judge. 237 The judge should then allow the attorneys to

229. See Acker, supra note 99, at 560 ("[W]e try cases on the assumption that intelligent
jurors know what is happening[,] ... [and] [s]ilent jurors remain confused about case issues.")
(quoting Chief Judge John F. Grady of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois)).
230. See id.
231. Krupp, supra note 10, at 12 ("[A]dvocates of juror questions have pointed to the salutary
benefits of jurors being able to seek clarification by questioning the witness before the witness is
off the stand.").
232. See id.
233. Sylvester, supra note 39, at 217-21.
234. See ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 39(b)(10) cmt. (1995).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. ARiz. R. CIV. P. 39(b)(10).
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make objections out of the presence of the jury.238 This method would
help alleviate the problem of attorneys alienating the jury by raising
objections to their questions. 239 It would also allow the court or
attorneys to alter any questions to abide by the rules of evidence and
240
prevent jurors from hearing inadmissible questions.
The guidelines should indicate which party will pose the jurors'
questions to the witnesses. The most neutral source would be the
judge. The judge should ask the question verbatim whenever possible,
rephrasing only when necessary to satisfy the rules of evidence.
Allowing attorneys to ask the questions could potentially indicate to
the jury that the question benefits a particular party. As several
courts currently allow, after the question has been asked and
answered, both parties should be allowed to reexamine the witness on
241
any issue implicated by the jurors' questions.
V. CONCLUSION
The propriety of allowing jurors to question witnesses during
trial is a salient issue in many jurisdictions. Our adversarial system of
justice is premised on a passive and impartial trier of fact making
decisions based on evidence presented by opposing parties. Juror
questioning may have negative implications for the adversarial system
and result in deprivation of the constitutional right to a fair trial
before an impartial jury. Due to this potential ramification, some
critics argue that the practice should be prohibited. However,
problems can be limited or avoided entirely by implementing proper
procedural safeguards. Regardless of these safeguards, courts should
always use caution in deciding whether to allow the practice in a given
case and in establishing the specific procedures to be followed.
Kirsten DeBarba*

238. See United States v. Bush, 47 F.3d 511, 515 (2d Cir. 1995); see also supra notes 100-03
and accompanying text.
239. Id.
240. See id.; DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 516 (4th Cir. 1985).
241. E.g., United States v. Richardson, 233 F.3d 1285, 1288 (11th Cir. 2000).
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